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Criminal Law
CRIMINAL

LAW-CONTEMPT-DISTINGUISHING

FACTOR BETWEEN

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT IS THE PURPOSE FOR
WHICH SENTENCE IS IMPOSED.

United States v. North (1980)
William Eyler was indicted along with Irving North for his participation in a bank fraud scheme. 1 Having pleaded guilty to a number
of charges in the indictment, Eyler was serving two concurrent sentences
for his offenses when he was subpoenaed to testify at North's trial.2
Although he had previously agreed to cooperate with the government,
Eyler refused to testify against North, invoking his fifth amendment
privilege against self incrimination. 8 Eyler was granted "use" immunity 4 and the trial court ordered him to testify, advising him that,
should he refuse, he would be held in contempt. 5 Eyler was further
advised that he could purge himself of this contempt by thereafter testifying.6 Having been afforded additional opportunities to testify 7 and,
on each occasion, having been warned that a contempt sentence would
interrupt his present concurrent criminal sentences, s Eyler persisted in
his refusal to testify.9 As a result, he was held in contempt and given a
1. United States v. North, 621 F.2d 1255, 1257 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
2. Id. Eyler had been sentenced on his guilty plea to concurrent sentences of three-and-one-half and four years. id.
3. Id. The privilege against self incrimination is afforded by the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution which provides that no person

shall "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S.

CONsT. amend. V.
4. 621 F.2d at 1257. The statutory provision under which Eyler was
granted immunity provided that once immunity had been granted,
the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of
his privilege against self incrimination; but no testimony or other
information compelled under the order . . . may be used against the

witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving
a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). For the statutory provisions relating to the procedure
to be followed in granting use immunity, see id. § 6003.
5. 621 F.2d at 1257.
6. Id. Eyler was advised by the trial judge of his opportunity to purge
himself of his contempt each time he refused to testify. Id.
7. Id. Eyler refused to testify once on July 12 and twice on July 13, and
was informed on each occasion that he could purge himself of the contempt
by testifying. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The court, before imposing the contempt sentence, stated to Eyler:
"Now, you can purge yourself of that contempt by now testifying; but, persisting in the refusal, we are through with the proceeding and we are ready to
proceed with the trial." Id. at 1260. (emphasis by the court). Counsel for

(625)
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six-month sentence to commence immediately, after which the running
of his current prison terms would resume.' 0
After the conclusion of North's trial," Eyler filed a motion for reduction of sentence, 12 claiming that his contempt was civil in nature
and, thus, that his sentence must terminate simultaneously with the end
of North's trial."3 This motion was denied by the district court. 14 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting
en bane,1" affirmed the order of the district court, holding that a conEyler, at oral argument, emphasized that Eyler was given the opportunity to
be heard on the charges and that he was aware of the contempt proceeding.
Id. at 1263 n.12. For a discussion of the right of a contemnor to speak in his
own behalf and in mitigation of sentence on the contempt charge, see note
38 and accompanying text infra.
10. 621 F.2d at 1257. At the time of Eyler's citation for contempt, the
trial court did not specify whether Eyler was being held in civil contempt or
in criminal contempt. Id. at 1260. The court's minute entry and formal
order, dated July 13, 1979, merely indicate that Eyler was sentenced to a fixed
term of six months in jail with the provision that this sentence interrupt his

current sentences. Id.
After the district court imposed this sentence, Eyler's counsel requested a
clarification of whether the court's order required that Eyler be incarcerated
locally during the six-month period or permitted him to be returned to the
facility at Morgantown, West Virginia, where he was serving his prior sentence.
Id. at 1260-61. The district court directed that Eyler be returned to Morgantown with "the only effect of this contempt sentence . . . be[ing] that his
sentence will be lengthened accordingly." Id. at 1261. For a discussion of
the district court's failure to characterize the nature of the contempt citation,
see notes 55-63 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the significance placed by the Third Circuit on the district court's willingness to
return Eyler to Morgantown, see note 63 and accompanying text infra.
11. North's trial proceeded without Eyler's testimony and concluded on
July 17, four days after Eyler's last refusal to testify. 621 F.2d at 1257.
12. Id. Eyler moved the court to vacate his sentence under the provisions of rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides
for the correction of an illegal sentence and which also provides that "the
court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
13. 621 F.2d at 1257. Eyler's claim for a reduction in sentence was based
upon a statutory provision for civil contempt, which provides, in pertinent
part:

(a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any
court or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause
shown to comply with an order of the court to testify . . . the court,
upon such refusal, . . . may summarily order his confinement at a
suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such
testimony . . . No period of such confinement shall exceed the life

of

-

(1) the court proceeding, or
(2) the term of the gand jury, including extensions, before which such
refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall
such confinement exceed eighteen months.
28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976). It was Eyler's contention that since North's trial had
ended, this section required that his six-month sentence be vacated. 621 F.2d
at 1256-57.
14. 621 F.2d at 1257.
15. The case was originally heard by Chief Judge Seitz, and Circuit Judges
Garth and Sloviter. The court ordered a rehearing en banc and the case was
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tempt sentence imposed against a recalcitrant trial witness for the purpose of punishing him for his refusal to testify is criminal in nature.
United States v. North, 621 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
The United States Supreme Court first examined the distinction
between criminal and civil contempt in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co.16 In Gompers, the defendant labor organizers had been found
guilty of contempt for failure to obey an injunction, 17 and were sentenced to prison terms. 18 On the defendants' appeal, the Supreme
Court found that the sentence imposed had been for civil rather than
criminal contempt.' 9 In so finding, the Court outlined the differences
between civil and criminal contempt, stating that
[i]t is not the fact of punishment, but
purpose that often serve to distinguish
of cases. If it is for civil contempt the
and for the benefit of the complainant.
contempt the sentence is punitive, to
20
of the court.

rather its character and
between the two classes
punishment is remedial,
But if it is for criminal
vindicate the authority

Expressing the "purpose test" for distinguishing between the two classes
of contempt, the Court stated that the imposition of a civil contempt
sentence is intended to coerce the defendant to do what he had refused
to do, while a criminal contempt sanction operates not as a coercive
remedy, but solely as punishment for the completed act of disobedience. 21
In Shillitani v. United States,22 the Supreme Court, discussed this
correlation between the purpose for which a contempt sentence is imposed and the nature of the contempt sentence. 23 The petitioner in
reheard by Chief Judge Seitz, and Circuit Judges Aldisert, Adams, Gibbons,
Rosenn, Weis, Garth, Higginbotham, and Sloviter. Judge Garth wrote the
opinion of the court. Chief Judge Seitz filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Judge Higginbotham joined. Judge Aldisert also wrote a dissenting opinion.
16. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).

17. Id. at 435. The District of Columbia Supreme Court had issued an
injunction restraining the defendants from boycotting the complainant company, or from publishing or otherwise making any statements that the complainant was, or had been, on the "unfair" or "we don't patronize" lists published by the American Federation of Labor. Id. at 436.
18. Id. at 425. The three defendants were sentenced to terms of six
months, nine months, and twelve months respectively. Id.
19. Id. at 441-52.
20. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 442-43. For a discussion of the characteristics of criminal and
civil contempt sentences, see notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra. Compare Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968) (contempt sentence
imposing unconditional fine payable to court for appellant's "willful and wanton
disregard" of court's order to produce documents is criminal in nature) with
McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939) (contempt sentence ordering that
defendant be held in jail until he purges himself of contempt by obeying

order to testify is civil).
22. 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
23. Id. at 368.
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Shillitani refused to testify before a grand jury, 24 and was held in contempt and sentenced to a prison term, 25 subject to the condition that his

sentence would be terminated if he testified. 26 The Supreme Court held
that "the conditional nature of the sentence" rendered the action a civil
contempt proceeding.27 The Court further stated that, although any
imprisonment has both punitive and deterrent effects, a contempt sentence must be viewed as remedial, and therefore civil in nature, if
release is conditioned on the contemnor's willingness to testify.28 However, where a fixed sentence has been imposed which does not provide
the contemnor with an opportunity to terminate his sentence by purging
himself of the contempt, it has been held that the contempt is criminal
29
in nature.
In further distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt, the
Shillitani Court stated that before a judge resorts to criminal sanctions,
he should first consider the feasibility of coercing testimony through the
imposition of civil contempt sanctions and determine that the civil
remedy would be inappropriate.3 0 The Supreme Court stated, moreover, that a court must have "good reason" to believe that the civil
24. Id. at 365-66. Petitioner was granted immunity and ordered to answer
certain questions. Id. at 366.
25. Id. at 366. Petitioner was sentenced to a two-year prison term. Id.
Petitioner was not indicted or given a jury trial. Id. at 365. He asserted that
the absence of indictment and jury trial made his sentence unconstitutional.
Id. at 366.
26. Id. at 365.
27. Id. Since the contempt proceeding was determined to be civil rather
than criminal, indictment or trial by jury was not constitutionally required.

Id.
28. Id. at 370. See also Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Skinner court stated that a judgment of civil contempt is conditional
and may be lifted if the contemnor purges himself of the contempt. Id. at
688-89. The court further stated that "since sanctions imposed in civil contempt proceedings must always give the alleged contemnor the opportunity to
bring himself into compliance [with the prior court order], the sanction cannot
be one that does not come to an end when he repents his past conduct and
purges himself." Id. at 689, citing Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th
Cir. 1965).
29. See United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975). The Liddy court held that a conviction for
criminal contempt results in a fixed sentence that must be served regardless
of whether the contemnor subsequently purges his contempt by complying
with the court order. 510 F.2d at 675-76. The court stated that, as a result
of the fixed nature of a criminal contempt sentence, "the coercive element
inherent in civil contempt is lost when resort is had to criminal contempt."
Id. at 676.
30. 384 U.S. at 371 n.9. The Supreme Court noted that the requirement
that the court determine the feasibility of coercing testimony by imposing civil
sanctions before imposing a criminal contempt sentence is dictated by the
principle that a court should exercise "the least possible power adequate to
the end proposed." Id. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,
(1821).
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contempt sanction would be inappropriate. 1 In United States v.
Wilson,32 the Supreme Court found that the "good reason" requirement,
enunciated in Shillitani, was satisfied by the fact that the contemnors
were already incarcerated at the time of their contemptuous acts. 8 In
United States v. DiMauro,8 4 the Eighth Circuit determined that a criminal contempt sentence had been properly imposed, pursuant to the
Shillitani requirements, for the defendant's refusal to testify because the
trial record revealed that the judge had considered and rejected the
possibility of civil contempt. 8 It was the belief of the Eighth Circuit
that Shillitani had not diminished the historic powers of a court to
punish criminally for the refusal to testify without first having to resort
86
to civil sanctions.
The defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding is entitled to a
number of due process protections which are not afforded in a civil
contempt proceeding.8 7 Before an individual may be found to be in
criminal contempt and consequently sentenced, he must be given reasonable notice of the specific charges and an opportunity to respond and
speak in his own defense and in mitigation of punishment. 8 However,
summary disposition, as opposed to disposition upon notice and hearing,
is appropriate for "direct contempt" as when the contempt consists of a
refusal of a trial witness to testify after having been granted immunity.8 9
31. 884 U.S. at 371 n.9.
32. 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
33. Id. at 317 n.9. The Court found "good reason" to impose criminal
sanctions because the threat of civil contempt would provide little incentive
for the contemnors to testify due to their current incarceration. Id.
34. 441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971).
35. Id. at 435. It was asserted by the defendant that Shillitani prohibited
a court from resorting to criminal contempt sanctions without first attempting

to coerce the testimony of a recalcitrant witness by imposing a civil contempt

sanction. Id. at 432.
36. Id. at 434-35, citing Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965);
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959) (court had imposed criminal contempt sanctions without first resorting to civil sanctions).
37. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text infra.
38. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 498-99 (1974). The right to allo-

cution on the charges allows the defendant the opportunity to be heard in
defense of his actions before sentence is imposed and the Court analogized
this right to the right to respond to the charges in a contempt proceeding.
Id. at 498. For the requirements pertaining to notice and hearing in a criminal contempt case, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
39. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 315-19. The right to respond
to the charges, however, has been recognized by the Supreme Court as attaching in cases in which punishment was imposed summarily as well as in notice
and hearing cases. See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972) (contemnor nor.
mally has been given opportunity to speak on his own behalf where punishment is imposed summarily).
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for due
process protection to defendants in criminal contempt cases:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and
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In addition, the Supreme Court has mandated that "sentences exceeding
six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed absent a jury
trial or waiver thereof." 40 Finally, as to when a contempt sentence
should commence running in those cases where the contemnor is currently serving a prison sentence, eight courts of appeals have held that a
civil contempt sentence may interrupt a previously imposed federal
prison sentence. 41 The courts have stated that civil confinement could
have no coercive effect if credit were given against the original sentence
42
for time spent in confinement for the contempt offense.
Although generally, civil contempt sentences, imposed for the purpose of coercing testimony, result in conditional sentences while criminal
contempt sentences, imposed for the purpose of punishing the contemnor, result in unconditional sentences, some courts have imposed
sentences which combine elements of both civil and criminal contempt.43
that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order
shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered
of record.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). The rule further provides that "a criminal contempt
except as provided in sub-division (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice." FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
40. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966). The Supreme Court
exercised its supervisory power by requiring a jury trial in criminal contempt
cases where the sentence exceeds six months. Id. This right to trial by jury
exists only in cases of criminal contempt. See United States v. DiMauro, 441
F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971) (jury trial is obviously mark of criminal contempt
conviction). The Cheff rule was raised to the level of a constitutional requirement in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
41. See United States v. Dien, 598 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Garmon,
572 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Hartzell), 542
F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Marshall), 532 F.2d
410 (5th Cir. 1976); Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1975);
Williamson v. Saxbe, 513 F.2d 1309 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Liddy,
510 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975);
Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1974). The practice of interrupting a prison term to impose a civil contempt sentence has the effect of
extending the running of the original criminal sentence. The power of the
trial judge to modify a previously imposed sentence was discussed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Addonizio, in which the Court stated that:
Once a sentence has been imposed, the trial judge's authority to modify
it is also circumscribed. Federal Rule Crim. Proc. 35 now authorizes
District Courts to reduce a sentence within 120 days after it has
been imposed or after it has been affirmed on appeal. The time period, however, is jurisdictional and may not be extended.
442 U.S. 178, 189 (1979).
42. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 169
(3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en
banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975). It should be noted that the cases
in which the courts of appeals have accepted the practice of interrupting a
current prison term for a contempt sentence are all cases dealing with civil
contempt.
43. See notes 44-53 and accompanying text infra.
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In Reina v. United States, 44 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
a "hybrid" 45 criminal contempt sentence which consisted of a term of
two years of imprisonment with a sixty-day period in which the contemnor could purge himself of the contempt by testifying.46 The
sentence imposed in Reina demonstrates the characteristics of a "hybrid"
criminal contempt sentence: a fixed prison term, with the provision that
the contemnor has a specified period in which he can purge himself of
the contempt. 47 However, the propriety of using this "hybrid" sentencing technique is in doubt following the comments made by the Supreme
Court in Shillitani. In that case, the Court observed that a "court may
impose a determinate sentence which includes a purge clause. This
type of sentence would benefit an incorrigible witness. It raises none
of the problems surrounding a judicial command that unless the witness
testifies within a specified time he will be imprisoned for a term of
years." 48 The Supreme Court went on, however, to cite Reina as an
example of the type of sentence which, in its view, raised problems, the
49
nature of which the Court failed to articulate.
In addition to the expressly conditional sentence approved in Reina,
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Wilson,50 approved a fixed
criminal contempt sentence which provided that the contemnor's subsequent willingness to testify would be taken into account when consider44. 364 U.S. 507 (1960).
45. This is a term used by the Third Circuit in North to describe contempt
sentences containing characteristics of both civil and criminal contempt. See
621 F.2d at 1264.
46. 364 U.S. at 514. Although the Supreme Court affirmed this "hybrid"
criminal contempt sentence, the Court explicitly declined to address the other
issues which this type of sentence might present because the issues were not
raised by the parties. Id. at 515.
47. The fixed term of the sentence is a characteristic of criminal contempt,
whereas the opportunity for the contemnor to purge himself of his contempt
is present in a civil contempt sentence. See notes 24-29 and accompanying
text supra.

48. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. at 370 n.6, citing Reina v. United
States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960). It has been noted by one commentator that "[t]he
difficulty in determining whether Shillitani precludes all fixed criminal sentences with a purge clause is compounded by the Court's failure to articulate

its objections to this type of sentence." Kuhns, The Summary Contempt
Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88 YALE L.J. 39, 115 (1978). Kuhns
posits that the only possible objection to the "hybrid" criminal contempt sen-

tence is that some contemnors may not yield to the coercion of a conditional

fixed sentence and a fixed sentence based solely or primarily on a coercive
purpose may be excessive. Id. at 116. Kuhn suggests that the fear that judges
may impose disproportionately severe fixed conditional sentences may be
sufficient reason to eliminate this sentencing option and adopt statutes which
permit conditional fixed sentences of a limited duration. Id. at 116-17 n.446,
citing MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 767-19c (Supp. 1978) (one year imprisonment

and up to ;10,000 fine subject to recalling of grand jury and commutation of sentence upon witness's agreeing to purge himself of contempt).
49. 384 U.S. at 370 n.6.
50. 421 U.S. 309 (1975). See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
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ing a motion for reduction of sentence. 51 The Eighth Circuit, in United

States v. DiMauro, 2 imposed a sentence similar to that imposed in
Wilson, in that the sentencing judge made it clear that the defendants'

subsequent willingness to testify would have a bearing on their motions
53
for reduction of sentence.
Against this background, Judge Garth, writing for the majority in
North, began his analysis of the nature of the contempt sentence imposed upon Eyler by examining the record of the trial proceedings.64
Judge Garth concluded that it was the intent of the district court to
impose a criminal, as opposed to a civil, contempt sentence,5 5 basing his
determination on three factors documented in the trial court's record. 56
First, the majority noted that Eyler's counsel raised the issue of trial by
jury for a contempt sentence in excess of six months, a consideration
which is only present in a criminal contempt case. 57 Second, the majority asserted that a "fair reading" of the district judge's advice to Eyler
is demonstrative of an intent to impose an unconditional sentence, 58 a
characteristic of criminal contempt. 59 Finally, the majority noted that
51. 421 U.S. at 312. The defendant was sentenced to a six-month prison
term, with the sentencing judge making it clear that he would consider reducing the sentence, or eliminating it completely, if the defendant testified. Id.

52. 441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971).
supra.

See notes 34-36 and accompanying text

53. 441 F.2d at 431. The defendants were sentenced to three year prison
terms, with the provision that if they testified prior to the discharge of the
grand jury or the expiration of the 120 day period under rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that factor would be taken into account in a
motion for reduction of sentence under that rule. Id., citing FED. R. CRMt.
P. 35. In support of its finding that the sentence imposed was for criminal,
as opposed to civil, contempt, the court in DiMauro distinguished the sentence
imposed therein from the sentence in Shillitani, stating that this was an unconditional sentence wherein the defendant's subsequent willingness to testify
did not result in their unconditional release. 441 F.2d at 432. For a discussion of the sentence imposed in Shillitani, see notes 24-26 and accompanying
text supra.
54. 621 F.2d at 1261.

55. Id. at 1261-62.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1261, citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); United
States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 980 (1975); United States v. Boe, 491 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1974). For a
discussion of the right to a jury trial, see note 40 and accompanying text supra.
For the trial court's reference to this issue, see 621 F.2d at 1259.
58. 621 F.2d at 1261. For the text of the district court judge's advice to
Eyler, see id. at 1258-61. See also note 9 supra.
59. For a discussion of unconditional contempt sentences, see note 29
and accompanying text supra. In concluding that the contempt was criminal
in nature, the majority rejected the view that a trial judge must expressly
consider the relative appropriateness of civil contempt sanctions prior to the
imposition of criminal sanctions, a rule enunciated in United States v. DiMauro,
441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971). 621 F.2d at 1261 n.9 (emphasis added). For
a discussion of the DiMauro rule, see notes 34-35 and accompanying text

supra.
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it would be inconsistent for the district judge to release Eyler from local
custody if the purpose of the contempt sentence was to coerce Eyler to
testify at North's trial, thus presenting further support for the conclusion that the district court intended to impose an unconditional criminal
contempt sentence.6 0 The majority asserted that this conclusion was
supported by the actions taken by the district court after the trial had
concluded. 61 The majority referred first to the district court's denial of
Eyler's motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to the statute authorizing
the civil contempt sanction. 62 Furthermore, Judge Garth noted that
the district judge, on the same day he refused Eyler's motion for a reduction in sentence, clarified to the warden of the Morgantown Federal
Correctional Institution that Eyler's six-month contempt sentence would
interrupt his current sentences, thereby extending his total length of
63
incarceration in the prison.
The majority found further support for its conclusion through the
application of the "purpose test" 64 to the circumstances of this case.65
Recognizing two possible purposes for the contempt sentence, i.e. either
to punish Eyler for his refusal to testify or to coerce Eyler to testify,66
the majority reasoned that it would be implausible to conclude that the
district court would have imposed a civil sanction which would have
virtually no coercive effect upon Eyler in this case.67 Judge Garth concluded that, in light of the fact that Eyler had refused to testify in the
face of three explicit warnings 68 and that a civil contempt sentence
would be ineffective in coercing Eyler's testimony, 9 the district court
60. 621 F.2d at 1261-62. See note 10 supra.
61. 621 F.2d at 1262.
62. Id. Judge Garth reasoned that if the district judge had intended to
impose a civil contempt sentence, the district judge would have corrected the
sentence to conform to the statute. Id. For the text of the statute authorizing
the imposition of a civil contempt sentence, see 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976).
63. 621 F.2d at 1262. Judge Garth determined that the content of this
letter clarifying Eyler's sentence was consistent with his conclusion that the
district court intended to impose an unconditional sentence. Id.
64. For a discussion of the "purpose test" for distinguishing criminal and
civil contempt, see notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
65. 621 F.2d at 1262-63.
66. Id. at 1262. The majority noted that one possible purpose for the
district court's imposition of the contempt sentence was to punish Eyler for
his "contumacious, unexplained refusal to testify." Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 1263. The majority stated that since, as a practical matter, a
civil sentence would have lasted only a few days until the trial had ended, a
civil contempt sanction would have virtually no coercive effect. Id. Additionally, since Eyler was already incarcerated, the threat of an added few days
of imprisonment for his refusal to testify had virtually no coercive effect. Id.,
citing United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 317 n.9. For a discussion of Wilson,
see note 33 supra.
68. 621 F.2d at 1263. For a discussion of the trial judge's warnings to
Eyler concerning the consequences of his refusal to testify, see notes 5-10 and
accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
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enforced its order by imposing an unconditional six-month criminal
sentence. 70 The majority further asserted that even if Eyler's sentence
were to be interpreted as being conditional, in that he could have
purged himself of the contempt by testifying at North's trial, it could
still retain its criminal character since Eyler's sentence was no different
in substance than "hybrid" sentences imposed and approved in other
cases. 71 Judge Garth concluded his analysis by stating that in the future,
the district court should specify the nature of the contempt sentence
72
being imposed.
Chief Judge Seitz, in his dissenting opinion, claimed that the district
court's intention is "irrelevant" 73 unless Eyler had received "timely
notice that he was charged with a criminal offense." 74 The Chief Judge
noted that since the proceedings had been summary, Eyler could have
received "fair notice" 75 only from the manner in which the proceedings
were conducted.70 He therefore concluded that Eyler should not be
charged with notice of a criminal charge, because the hearing combined
elements of both civil and criminal contempt. 77 Furthermore, Chief
Judge Seitz voiced his belief that even if Eyler had received notice of
the criminal charge, he had been substantially prejudiced, because he
had been deprived of his right to be heard on the charge.78 Thus, because of the additional considerations which he had raised, the Chief
70. 621 F.2d at 1262.
71. Id. at 1263-65. For a discussion of "hybrid" criminal contempt sentences, see notes 44-53 and accompanying text supra. The majority noted
"that whereas Eyler had obstinately flouted the court's order at least three
times, Reina had asserted his legal position for not testifying in good faith
and was not contumaciously disrespectful of the court's order." 621 F.2d at
1264 n.15, citing Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. at 514. For a discussion of
Reina, see notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
72. 621 F.2d at 1265. Judge Garth stated that in the future, district judges
should specify the nature of the contempt and any conditions attached to the
sentence, including the statutory basis of the contempt sanction. Id.
73. 621 F.2d at 1265 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id., citing United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 295-98
(1947).
75. For a discussion of "fair notice," see notes 38-39 and accompanying
text supra.
76. 621 F.2d at 1265 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id. For a discussion of the proceedings leading up to Eyler's contempt
sentence, see notes 3-10 and accompanying text supra. The Chief Judge noted
that the district court had not conformed strictly to the procedural requirements of either type of contempt, but instead had made reference to the
requirements of both. 621 F.2d at 1265 n.l (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
78. 621 F.2d at 1265 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418
U.S. 488 (1974). Noting that the right of allocution is not an empty ritual
in a summary criminal contempt proceeding, the Chief Judge stated that "[a]
contemnor may be able to persuade the sentencing judge to consider, when
determining the length of sentences, such mitigating factors as the danger to
him or his family were he to testify. Such considerations would be irrelevant
in formulating the terms of a civil contempt order." 621 F.2d at 1266 (Seitz,
C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of the right to be heard on the charges in a
contempt proceeding, see note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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Judge concluded that the doubt should be resolved against characterizing Eyler's contempt as criminal and the case should be remanded to
79
the district court to modify its order.
Judge Aldisert, dissenting separately, agreed with the assertions of
Chief Judge Seitz but also disapproved of the practice of permitting a
contempt sentence to interrupt the running of a current criminal sentence.80 Judge Aldisert contended that, in light of the Supreme Court's
determination that once a prison sentence has been imposed it may not
be extended,8 ' cases approving of the interruption of criminal sentences
82
have been wrongly decided.
It is submitted that the Third Circuit correctly recognized that
when an appellate court must determine the nature of a contempt sentence, the appropriate inquiry for the court to make is to determine the
purpose for which the sentence was imposed.8 3 In resolving the issue
of the sentencing court's purpose, the reviewing court should examine
the nature of the sentence imposed,84 along with any practical considerations or characteristics of the sentencing proceedings that would shed
light on the trial court's purpose for the imposition of the sentence.85
However, it is suggested that the "purpose test" would not be appropriate in a situation in which the contemnor was not afforded the due
process protections required in a criminal contempt proceeding.8 6 In
79. 621 F.2d at 1266 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1266 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Referring to the provisions of
rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Judge Aldisert stated that
"if a defendant may not invoke the jurisdiction of the court to reduce his
sentences after 120 days, a fortiori, the government may not invoke that same
jurisdiction to increase or interrupt that sentence, directly or indirectly, by
sandwiching into it a new term of criminal contempt." Id. at 1267 (Aldisert,
J., dissenting). For a discussion of rule 35, see note 12 supra.
81. See note 41 supra.

82. 621 F.2d at 1267 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert noted that
his view on the propriety of interrupting a prison term by imposing a contempt sentence is in the minority. Id. This issue has not been addressed
directly by the Supreme Court, although this procedure was noted with approval by Justice Blackmun in United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 321 n.2
(Blackmun, J., concurring). However, eight courts of appeals currently permit
the interruption of a federal prison term for imposition of a civil contempt
sentence. See note 41 supra.
83. For a discussion of the "purpose test" for distinguishing criminal contempt from civil contempt, see notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
85. The court should look to whether a trial by jury was either received or
considered. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. It is further suggested that the manner in which the sentencing judge addressed the contemnor
could also bear on the issue of determining the purpose for the contempt.
Finally, the court should look to the circumstances surrounding the imposition
of the contempt and determine whether a civil sanction would serve its intended purpose of coercing the contemnor's testimony. See notes 31-33 and
accompanying text supra.
86. For a discussion of the due process protections afforded defendants in
a criminal contempt proceeding, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
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such a case, the sentencing judge's purpose would be irrelevant and the
87
defendant could not be charged with a criminal offense.
Examining the majority's application of this "purpose test" to the
facts of North, it is suggested that the majority's conclusion that the
contempt was criminal is supported by logic.88 Under the circumstances
of this case, the Third Circuit correctly reasoned that the only reasonable interpretation of the district court's purpose for imposing the
sentence is an intent to punish Eyler for his refusal to testify, not for
the purpose of coercing his testimony.8 9 It is suggested that this conclusion is supported by the unconditional nature of the sentence, 90 along
with the fact that, due to Eyler's present incarceration and the pending
conclusion of North's trial, a civil contempt sentence would not achieve
its purpose of coercing Eyler's testimony. 91 Furthermore, the fact that
the district court considered the question of whether a jury trial was
necessary 92 is a further indication of the criminal nature of the pro93
ceeding.
Although Chief Judge Seitz, in his dissenting opinion, focused upon
the procedural aspects of the case in the formulation of his position that
the intention of the district court was "irrelevant," 94 it is submitted
that his position is not supported by precedent or by the record of the
trial court proceedings. 95 Although the trial court did not specifically
87. The sentence could not be considered to be criminal in nature because the imposition of a criminal sentence without the defendant being
afforded his due process protections would be unconstitutional. See notes
37-40 & 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 89-93 and accompanying text infra.
89. See notes 64-70 and accompanying text supra.
90. For a discussion of unconditional contempt sentences, see notes 27-29
and accompanying text supra. For the court's discussion of the nature of the
contempt sentence imposed, see note 58 and accompanying text supra.
91. For the court's analysis of these facts and their bearing on the issue
of the sentencing judge's purpose, see note 67 supra. The Supreme Court has
stated that the fact that the contemnor was presently incarcerated satisfies the
"good reason" requirement of Shillitani for the imposition of criminal sanctions. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 317 n.9. See notes 31-33 and
accompanying text supra.
92. 621 F.2d at 1259.
93. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. In its analysis of the district court proceedings, the court noted that the district court's subsequent
denial of Eyler's motion for correction of sentence was also indicative of the
district court's intent to impose criminal sanctions. See note 62 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested, however, that this action by the district
court subsequent to the trial is not necessarily indicative of its intent at the
time that sentence was imposed.
94. See notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 75-79 and accompanying text supra. The Chief Judge asserted that Eyler could not be held in criminal contempt unless he received
timely notice that he was charged with a criminal offense. See notes 73-77
and accompanying text supra. However, the case upon which Chief Judge
Seitz relies in the development of his opinion dealt with the notice requirements for contempts not committed in the presence of the court. See United
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state that Eyler was being sentenced for criminal contempt, the district
court's contempt order satisfied the procedural requirements for summary disposition of contempt charges for contempt committed in the
presence of the court.96 Furthermore, the Chief Judge's contention
that Eyler was deprived of his right to allocution on the charge is not
supported by the record. 9
Although the majority contends that the Supreme Court approved
a "hybrid" criminal contempt sentence in Reina, the Reina Court explicitly refused to reach that issue because it was not raised by the
parties.98 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Shillitani, cast doubt
upon the propriety of imposing the type of "hybrid" sentence that was
imposed in Reina.9 9 As a result, it is suggested that the majority's
assertion that Eyler's sentence would retain its criminal character because
it is no different in substance than the sentence imposed in Reina is
questionable in light of the uncertainty surrounding the "hybrid" criminal contempt sentence.' 00 Despite this uncertainty, however, it is suggested that there are circumstances in which the "hybrid" criminal
sentencing technique would have great value in coercing the testimony
of a recalcitrant witness.' 0' By imposing a fixed maximum sentence
and providing the contemnor with a period in which he can purge himself of the contempt, the recalcitrant witness faces a stronger coercion to
testify than would be the case if he faced a civil contempt sanction the
duration of which was limited to the term of the grand jury or length
of the trial. 10 2 This is particularly evident in a situation in which the
trial is close to completion or the grand jury term is close to expiration,
in which case the most effective method of coercing valuable testimony
would be by the imposition of a determinate sentence with a purge
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 295-98 (1974); note 73 and
accompanying text supra. This is distinguishable from the situation in North,
as the instant contempt was committed in the presence of the court. See notes

3-9 and accompanying text supra.

For the due process requirements for

criminal contempts not committed in the presence of the court, see FED. R.
CiM. P. 42(b).
96. 621 F.2d at 1260. The order entered by the district court set forth
the facts leading to the imposition of the contempt sentence upon Eyler. Id.
The provisions of rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
require that the order recite the facts, but does not require a characterization
of the contempt. See note 39 supra.
97. See note 9 supra.
98. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
99. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
100. See notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra.

101. For a discussion of the desirability of the use of a "hybrid," or fixed
conditional, criminal contempt sentence, in the case of a recalcitrant witness,
see Kuhns, supra note 48, at 113-18.
102. For a discussion of one commentator's view of the only possible
objection to this type of sentence, see note 48 supra.
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clause. 103 As a result, it is suggested that a sentencing judge should
have the power, either at his discretion or by statute, 104 to impose a
fixed sentence with a purge clause in cases of criminal contempt.105
With respect to Judge Aldisert's assertion that a contempt sentence
should not interrupt the running of current criminal sentences, 0 6 it is
suggested that the reasoning that supports the approval of this practice
in cases involving civil contempt may be inapplicable to this case of
criminal contempt. 07 In those cases adopting this practice, the court
reasoned that the coercion of the civil contempt sentence would be lost
if credit against the original sentence is given for time spent in confinement for contempt. 08 Since coercion is not a purpose for criminal
contempt sanctions, 09 this reasoning would not justify the interruption
of a sentence by a criminal contempt sentence. 110
The North decision makes it clear that, in the Third Circuit, the
distinguishing factor between criminal and civil contempt is the purpose
for which the sanctions were imposed."' However, as a practical matter,
the impact of the North decision is derived from the court's directive to
the district judges that they specify the particular nature of the contempt imposed, including the statutory authority upon which the
103. See note 67 supra. For a discussion of the coercive effect of conditional sentences, see notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
104. For a discussion of the desirability of regulating the imposition of

this type of sentence by the enactment of statutes, see note 48 supra.
105. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
106. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.

107. For a listing of the circuits which have permitted the practice of
interrupting a current federal criminal sentence by imposing a civil contempt
sentence, see note 41 supra.

108. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166,
169 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(en banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975).

109. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
110. In those cases in which the practice of interrupting a current sentence
was approved, the basis of the contemnor's attack on this practice was the
assertion that it was prohibited by a federal statute which provides that:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an
offense shall commence to run from the date on which such person is
received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such
sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such person credit
toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence is imposed.
18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1976). For a list of these cases, see note 41 supra. However,
the court in United States v. Liddy cited the legislative history of section 3568
as demonstrative of a concern on the part of Congress for establishing a firm

commencement date for a sentence, not with the subsequent calculation and
termination date. 510 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 980 (1975).

It is suggested that this rationale, in support of the

practice of interrupting a current sentence with a contempt sentence, would
e equally applicable to criminal contempt or civil contempt.
111. See notes 64-70 and accompanying text supra.
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639

contempt is based." 2 This should effectively eliminate the need to
resolve issues such as those presented in North in the future." 3 However, the Third Circuit's approval of the "hybrid" criminal sentencing
technique, despite its questionable status following Shillitani, adds additional confusion to this area of the law of contempt that will not be
4
resolved until the Supreme Court acts definitively on the issue."
Donald N. Goldrosen
112. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
113. 621 F.2d at 1265.
114. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
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-

COLLATERAL

ESTOPPEL -

THE DOCTRINE OF

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BARS THE EVIDENTIARY USE OF CONDUCT,
WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF A PRIOR ACQUITrAL, WHERE
THE INTRODUCTION OF SUCH EVIDENCE REPRESENTS THE
RELITIGATION OF A PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED ISSUE.

United States v. Keller (1980)
In January of 1979, the defendant, Kerby Keller, was indicted in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
on a charge of conspiracy to distribute phencycladine phosphate (PCP),
a non-narcotic controlled substance.' During the trial which resulted in
his conviction, 2 the defendant did not deny his participation in the con4
spiracy3 but defended on the ground that he had been entrapped.
1. United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154, 1155 (3d Cir. 1980). The defendant was charged with conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substances Act
which provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance ......
Id., citing
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
2. 624 F.2d at 1155. The defendant was found guilty after a four-day
jury trial and was sentenced to a term of three years' imprisonment. Id.
3. Id. The evidence indicated that the conspiracy ran from October 18
through October 21, 1977 and involved Anderson, a government informant,
Keller, and four co-defendants. Id. Anderson received a call from one of
the co-defendants requesting two pounds of PCP. Id. According to Keller's
testimony, Anderson contacted Keller to mention the possibility of selling
the PCP, as Anderson needed money to help pay his bills. Id. at 1155-56.
Keller further testified that he agreed to participate only after Anderson had
suggested several times that Keller supply the drugs and only because Anderson
stressed that he needed the money. Id. Keller delivered the PCP to Anderson's home on October 20 where two of the co-defendants picked it up the
following day. Id. at 1155.
4. Id. Keller testified that Anderson had been a good friend for a number of years and was having serious medical and financial problems. Id.
Keller further stated that his concern over Anderson's financial problems had
prompted his participation in the sale of the PCP. Id. at 1155-56. For a discussion of the entrapment defense, see notes 81 &c85 and accompanying text
infra. For examples of the two approaches to the theory of entrapment,
compare Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) with Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. at 495 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
at 436 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 378
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts,
J., concurring). For commentary dealing with the two approaches to entrapment, see Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons,
and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Rotenberg, The Police
Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV. 871 (1963); Note, Entrapment in the Federal Courts: Sixty Years of Frustration, 10 N. ENG. L.

(640)
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Over defense counsel's objections, the government cross-examined the
defendant z concerning drug transactions which occurred subsequent to
the events charged in the present indictment,8 but for which Keller had
already been tried and acquitted.7 The first acquittal was also based
on an entrapment defense.8
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, the defendant claimed that the district court had erred in admitting the evidence of allegedly criminal conduct occurring subsequent
to the period of the indictment. 9 The Third Circuit 10 reversed and
remanded, holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the
evidentiary use of conduct for which the defendant had been previously
acquitted. United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1980).
The United States Supreme Court early recognized the application
of res judicata l to criminal proceedings in United States v. OppenREv. 179 (1974). See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 369-75
(1972). See also United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Janotti, 501
F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
5. 624 F.2d at 1156. Defense counsel objected that the government's questioning was not limited to any particular time period, however, the court
overruled the objections. Id.
6. Id. During cross-examination, the defendant testified that he had
delivered methamphetamine to Anderson or a third party on five or six occasions in 1978. Id.
7. Id. Keller was tried on charges of distributing methamphetamine to
Anderson and another individual on five occasions during 1978. Id.
8. Id. At the trial for the 1978 distributions of methamphetamine, Keller
admitted his participation but claimed that he was induced by Anderson, act-

ing as a government agent, to commit the crime. Id.
9. Id. There were three grounds for the claim of error: 1) subsequent
acts are inadmissible to show predisposition or intent; 2) the doctrine of
collateral estoppel bars evidentiary use of conduct for which defendant was
acquitted; and 3) the evidence was far more prejudicial than probative and,
therefore, should have been excluded under FED. R. EvIn. 403. 624 F.2d at
1156-57. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
10. The case was heard by judges Hunter, Higginbotham and Sloviter.
Judge Sloviter wrote the opinion for a unanimous panel.
11. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed. 1979). Res judicata is
defined as the "[r]ule that a final judgment rendered by a court of com-

petent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties

and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action." Id. It
should be noted that the courts generally use res judicata in a broad sense
describing the finality of a judgment, including collateral estoppel. lB J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE $ 0.441[2], at 3775 (2d ed. 1974). Collateral estoppel is defined as the doctrine whereby a '[p]rior judgment between [the]
same parties on a different cause of action is an estoppel as to those matters
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heimer.12 In 1948, the Supreme Court in Sealfon v. United StatesI s
endorsed the use of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, in cases involving different criminal offenses. 14 The Sealfon Court held that when
facts which are essential to a conviction are previously determined in a
defendant's favor by a verdict of not guilty, relitigation of those facts is
barred, thereby resulting in the preclusion of the subsequent prosecution. 15 While the doctrine of collateral estoppel was thus an established
in issue or points controverted, on determination of which finding or verdict
was rendered." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY, supra, at 237. Though the terms
are often used interchangeably, there is a significant difference in the opera-

tion of the two doctrines.

M.

GREEN,

BASIC

CIVIL

PROCEDURE

207 (1972).

"The difference lies in the fact that in res judicata the subsequent suit involves
the same cause of action, while in collateral estoppel the subsequent suit involves a different cause of action." Id. The Supreme Court has noted:
"Collateral estoppel" is an awkward phrase, but it stands for
extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice.
means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been
termined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again
relitigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.

an
It
debe

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
12. 242 U.S. 85 (1916). The defendant in Oppenheimer, indicted for conspiracy to steal assets from a trustee in bankruptcy, interposed a plea in bar
based on a previous adjudication concerning the same offense. Id. at 85-86.
In the previous adjudication, prosecution had been barred by the Statute of
Limitations. Id. at 86. The government argued that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel did not exist for criminal cases except in the modified form of the
fifth amendment double jeopardy clause. Id. at 87. The government further
argued that the previous decision based on the Statute of Limitations did not
prevent a second trial since the defendant had never been in jeopardy in
the sense of being before a jury upon the facts of the offense charged. Id.
In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that an acquittal on the basis of
the Statute of Limitations is a judgment on the merits, which goes to the
defendant's liability as a matter of substantive law. Id. Therefore, such an
acquittal offers no less protection against a second trial than an acquittal upon
the ground of innocence. Id. The Court went on to assert that the fifth
amendment was not intended to supplant what, in the civil law, is a fundamental principle of justice and held that the previous adjudication on the
merits would operate as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. Id. at 88.

13. 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
14. Id. at 580. The defendant was first tried and acquitted on charges
of conspiracy to defraud the United States by presenting false invoices to a
ration board. Id. at 576-77. The second trial was based on an indictment
charging the defendant with aiding and abetting the uttering and publishing
of the false invoices introduced in the conspiracy trial. Id. at 577. An essential element of the prosecution's case in the subsequent trial was an alleged
agreement between the defendant and a co-conspirator which was necessarily
proved to be non-existent by the verdict of acquittal in the former trial. Id.
at 579-80.

15. Id. at 580.

The Court noted that the basic facts in each trial were

identical and that the core of the prosecutor's case was virtually the same in
both trials. Id. The Court stated that the government could not be allowed
"a second attempt to prove the agreement which at each trial was crucial to
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rule of federal criminal law, 16 the Supreme Court's decision in Ashe v.
Swenson 17 elevated it to a constitutional requirement embodied in the
fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.'s

In that case, the

petitioner, Ashe, was prosecuted for the robbery of one of a group of
poker players and found not guilty due to insufficient evidence. 19 Six
weeks later, Ashe was charged with the robbery of another participant
in the same poker game.2 0 The Supreme Court found that the only
conceivable basis for the jury's decision in the first trial was that Ashe
was not one of the robbers, and, thus, held that collateral estoppel
would render a second prosecution for robbery impermissible. 21
the prosecutor's case and which was necessarily adjudicated in the former trial
to be non-existent." Id.
16. Id. See, e.g., Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886); United
States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Curzio, 170
F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Cowart, 118 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C.
1954). See generally Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata,
39 IowA L. REV. 317 (1954); Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and
Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1960); McLaren, The Doctrine of
Res Judicata As Applied to the Trial of Criminal Cases, 10 WASH. L. REV.
198 (1935).
17. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
18. Id. at 445. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[n]or
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In general, the double jeopardy clause
of the fifth amendment protects against multiple punishment for the same
offense and prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense. 3 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 655 (13th ed. 1973). The Supreme Court has held that
this guarantee is applicable to, and binding upon, the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Since the
Supreme Court determined in Ashe that the federal rule of collateral estoppel
is an integral feature of the double jeopardy clause, reprosecution when a
determinative issue has been previously adjudicated in the defendant's favor
is constitutionally prohibited. See 397 U.S. at 436. For a further discussion
of Ashe, see notes 19-21 and accompanying text infra.
19. 397 U.S. at 438. There was no question that an armed robbery had
occurred or that personal property had been taken from the victim, but the
state's evidence that petitioner had been one of the robbers was found to be
insufficient. Id. at 439.
20. Id. at 440. The witnesses in the second trial were essentially the same,
although their testimony with regard to the petitioner's identity was substantially stronger. Id. at 439-40.
21. Id. at 445. The Supreme Court emphasized that the prosecution could
not treat the defendant's acquittal as no more than a dry run for the second
prosecution simply by changing the name of the victim. Id. at 447. The
Court also cautioned that "federal decisions have made it clear that the rule of
collateral estoppel is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic
approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality."
id. at 444.
The facts of Ashe present a reprosecution situation involving slightly different offenses springing from the same criminal episode. See notes 19-20 and
accompanying text supra. With this type of fragmented prosecution, the traditional guarantee that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense would have offered no protection. 397 U.S. at 446. With the recent
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Although the leading Supreme Court decisions dealing with collateral estoppel involve fragmented prosecutions arising out of the same
criminal episode and resulting in a bar to retrial,2 2 collateral estoppel
has also been applied in the federal courts as an evidentiary defense,
barring the use of evidence of crimes of which a defendant has been
previously acquitted.28 The Third Circuit had endorsed collateral
estoppel as an evidentiary defense several years before the Ashe decision
in United States v. Simon 24 and United States v. DeAngelo.25 While
Ashe clearly mandates the application of collateral estoppel in approproliferation of statutory offenses, the doctrine of collateral estoppel has gained
0.418, at 2766; Mayers &
added significance. 1B J. MooRE, supra note 11,
Yarbrough, supra note 16. For a discussion of the impact of the Ashe decision, see Note, ConstitutionalLaw - Double Jeopardy - Collateral Estoppel Is
Constitutionally Required in Criminal Cases Because It Is Embodied in the
Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, 69 Micn. L. REv. 762 (1971) (hereinafter cited as "Michigan Note"); Note, Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy - Collateral Estoppel Is an Integral Part of the Fifth Amendment Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 590 (1970).
22. See notes 11-21 and accompanying text supra.
23. See United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961). In Kramer,
the defendant was first acquitted for the substantive offense of burglary. Id.
at 912. During a second trial for conspiracy to burglarize and receive stolen
goods, the government introduced evidence of the defendant's participation in
the burglaries which was substantially identical to that introduced in the first
trial. Id. at 915. The Second Circuit held that the government was collaterally estopped from attempting to prove a new charge by introducing
evidence of facts necessarily determined in the previous trial in the defendant's favor. Id. at 916. The court reasoned that whether the facts sought to
be precluded are mediate, that is, evidentiary, or ultimate in the second trial
should have no bearing on a court's decision to invoke collateral estoppel. Id.
at 917. Ultimate facts are those which would be essential elements of the
charge. Evergreen v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 720 (1944).

24. 225 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1955).

After trial on a two-count indictment,

Simon was acquitted on the charge of receiving stolen turkeys and found guilty
of the charge of possession of the same stolen turkeys. Id. at 261. The defendant's motion for a new trial was granted and the guilty verdict was set
aside. Id. On retrial of the possession charge, the trial court allowed evidence of the receipt of the stolen turkeys and testimony by the admitted thief
that he had delivered the turkeys to the defendant. Id. On appeal, the Third
Circuit reversed and held that "the government is estopped from relitigating
in a second trial facts already determined in the first." Id. at 262.
25. 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943). In DeAngelo, the defendant was first
indicted for robbery and acquitted. Id. at 467. In the subsequent trial for
conspiracy to commit robbery, the government introduced evidence to show the
defendant's participation in the substantive offense, even though it was not
necessary for the overt act requirement of the conspiracy charge. Id. Defense
counsel's offer of proof that the material issue of the defendant's presence and
participation in the robbery had been conclusively determined in the previous
trial was rejected. Id. at 468. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed on the
basis that the jury in the robbery trial had determined the issue of the defendant's participation adversely to the government and that to permit them
to raise the issue again in the subsequent trial constituted substantial error.
Id. at 469.
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priate reprosecution cases, 20 it does not provide any guidance as to
whether evidentiary use of conduct which was the subject of a prior
acquittal is constitutionally precluded.2 7 The two courts of appeals
which have considered this issue have regarded the guarantee against
double jeopardy as now incorporating a prohibition against the evidentiary use of conduct or crimes for which the defendant was previously
acquitted. 28 The Fifth Circuit, in Wingate v. Wainwright,29 held that,
under Ashe, the state cannot seek to relitigate for any purpose an issue
which was determined in a prior prosecution of the same party.8 0 Similarly, the Second Circuit's approach in United States v. Mespoulede 81
reflected the concern that "constitutionally rooted considerations of
fairness" prohibit introduction of any issues necessarily decided in the
defendant's favor in a trial for another offense.8 2
Other courts of appeals have favored a narrower interpretation of
the Ashe mandate, declining to view collateral estoppel as a complete
bar to evidentiary use of conduct that was the subject of a prior ac26. See United States v. Larkin, 605 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Sarno, 596 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Venable, 585 F.2d 71
(3d Cir. 1978). In Venable, the court rejected the defendant's plea that retrial was barred because there was no inconsistency between the earlier acquittal
and the subsequent charges. Id. at 78-79.
27. See 397 U.S. at 443. See also Note, Expanding Double Jeopardy: Collateral Estoppel and the Evidentiary Use of Prior Crimes of Which the Defendant Has Been Acquitted, 2 FLA. STATE U.L. REv. 511 (1974); Michigan
Note, supra note 21, at 772-73.
28. See United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 332 (2d Cir. 1979);
Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 1972); notes 29-32 and
accompanying text infra.
29. 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 214-15. The defendant in Wingate had been acquitted of two
robberies and was convicted on charges of a third unrelated robbery. Id. at
210. In an effort to prove course of conduct, the state introduced testimony

by the two store owners who were complainants in the prior acquittals that
the defendant had robbed them. Id. The Fifth Circuit saw no meaningful
difference in the quality of jeopardy to which a defendant is exposed in

relitigating a fact issue that is ultimate or one that is evidentiary in the
second prosecution. Id. at 213. The court stated:

In both instances the state is attempting to prove the defendant
guilty of an offense other than the one of which he was acquitted.
In both instances the relitigated proof is offered to prove some element of the second offense. In both instances the defendant is forced
to defend again against charges or factual allegations which he overcame in the earlier trial.
Id. at 213-14.
31. 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1979).
32. Id. at 330.

In the first trial in Mespoulede, the defendant was charged

with both possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to
distribute cocaine. Id. at 331. The possession count resulted in an acquittal,
but the conspiracy charge ended in a mistrial. Id. at 332. On retrial, the
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quittal.3 Instead, these courts have reasoned that evidence of other
crimes should not be rendered inadmissible by a defendant's acquittal
where it is not introduced for the purpose of relitigating the defendant's
guilt or innocence in the previous prosecution. 4 Although the rationales relied upon vary with the fact patterns presented, 35 these courts
defendant's motion to bar evidence of possession was denied. Id. Commenting
that "the constitutional question raised by this appeal cannot be decided in
the abstract," the Second Circuit found it necessary to examine the transcript
of the two trials in detail. Id. at 330. The court then found that analysis
of the first judgment revealed that the fact finder had determined that there
was no possession by the defendant since the other elements of the offense
were either stipulated or not in dispute. Id. at 333. Consequently, it concluded that the government was collaterally estopped from injecting this issue
into a second trial. Id. at 336.
33. See United States v. Van Cleave, 559 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1979);
Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979);
King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1978).
In Van Cleave, evidence of repainting and restamping a vehicle, relating
to a charge on which the defendant was acquitted, was held to be admissible
to prove motive and intent in a second trial concerning another stolen vehicle,
as an inseparable part of the offense with which the defendant was charged.
599 F.2d at 957. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Ashe, reasoning that the
second prosecution involved an entirely different criminal transaction and
therefore double jeopardy was not in issue. Id. at 956.
In Oliphant, two witnesses who were complainants against the defendant
on previous rape charges, of which he had been acquitted, were called to testify in a third prosecution against him for rape. 594 F.2d at 547. (The
factual situation presented is thus similar to Wingate. See note 30 supra.)
The state endeavored to prove through this testimony that Oliphant had engaged in similar prior acts of orchestration. 594 F.2d at 555. In all three
trials, Oliphant admitted that he had had intercourse with the complainants,
but contended that it was consensual. Id. at 554. The Sixth Circuit held that
the testimony of the two witnesses was not barred by collateral estoppel. Id.
at 555. The court noted that "[t]he juries which acquitted Oliphant could
easily have concluded both that Oliphant orchestrated the events surrounding
the prior sexual encounters and that the women had consented to his ultimate advances." Id., citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 444. In distinguishing
this case from Ashe, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the two other incidents
were not part of the same criminal episode. 594 at 554.
In King v. Brewer, the defendant was acquitted of the July 8th robbery
of Cal g: Bob's supermarket on the strength of an alibi defense. 577 F.2d at
437. In a subsequent trial for the July 7th robbery of Medd-O-Lane, the
state introduced evidence that tended to show that the defendant had received pellet wounds during the commission of the robbery at Cal & Bob's.
Id. at 439. Although both counsel had been cautioned at the pretrial conference to avoid any reference to the previous trial, the transcript revealed
that the defendant first raised the issue "to secure the advantage of the earlier
acquittal .

. . ."

Id. at 443.

The Eighth Circuit's holding that the evidence

was admissible was based both on a finding of invited error and a determination that Ashe was distinguishable from the facts at issue. Id. at 440,
443. The court noted that "the Ashe case is not controlling in this appeal.
In the Ashe case the separate charges arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence." Id. at 440.
34. See note 33 supra.
35. United States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954, 956 (10th Cir. 1979)
(charges in second prosecution involved a different criminal episode); Oliphant
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have generally found that evidence of another crime is not necessarily
rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the defendant was acquitted
of the charge.8 6
Notwithstanding the divergence of views among the courts of appeals regarding the scope of double jeopardy protection afforded by
Ashe,37 the federal courts uniformly acknowledge one fundamental
limitation upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel, namely, that the
doctrine will not be invoked when "a rational jury could have grounded
its verdict on an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration." 38 This limitation was thoroughly examined
by the Second Circuit in United States v. Cala.39 Cala was first charged
in California where it was alleged that, on August 9, 1972, he was in
possession of counterfeit currency with intent to defraud.4 0 Cala admitted possession on the stand, but claimed it was innocent possession
and was acquitted.4 1 Thereafter, Cala was indicted in New York on a
charge of conspiracy to transfer the same counterfeit currency, 1ihich
agreement was allegedly made during the month of July, 1972.42 Cala
contended that the government was collaterally estopped from proving
his intent to defraud, since the California acquittal necessarily resolved
the issue of criminal intent in his favor.43 The Second Circuit, however, found that the California jury's determination that the government
had failed in its proof of intent on or about August 9 did not mandate
a conclusion that Cala could not have had the requisite intent during
44
the earlier period.
v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547, 555 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979)
(witnesses' testimony in subsequent trial did not necessarily contradict jury's
conclusions in previous acquittal); King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435, 440-41 (8th
Cir. 1978) (evidence introduced for the purpose of impeaching credibility
rather than relitigation of defendant's guilt or innocence in the previous
trial).
36. United States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1979);
Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547, 554-55 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
877 (1979); King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435, 440-41 (8th Cir. 1978).
37. See notes 26-36 and accompanying text supra.
38. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 444 (citation omitted). See Douthit v.
Estelle, 540 F.2d 800, 806 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d
127, 138 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Addington, 471 F.2d 560, 567 (10th

Cir. 1973); United States v. Pappas, 445 F.2d 1194, 1199 (3d Cir. 1971).

39. 521 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 606.
41. Id. Cala testified that he had received the currency from an unknown
source and, while in an apprehensive state, had attempted only to destroy or
otherwise rid himself of the money. Id.
42. Id. Apparently, the government did not discover evidence of the
conspiracy until after the California trial. Id. at 607.
43. Id. at 608.
44. Id. "The indictments and records of both trials reveal not only that

in each case a separate crime relating to a different time period was alleged
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Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel is frequently the basis
for determining the admissibility of evidence presented in prior acquittals, there are instances in which courts have relied on the balancing
test of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 45 Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts may not be introduced solely to prove that a
defendant has criminal propensities. 46 However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, including "proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." 47 In United States v. Castro-Castro,4 8 the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the trial court to admit evidence of the defendant's
prior arrest for smuggling marijuana across the Mexican border even
though the defendant had been acquitted of that charge. 49 The court
rested its decision entirely on a finding that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in that the evidence, though undoubtedly prejudicial to
the defendant, was highly relevant to the government's task of proving
specific intent.50
but that the evidence introduced by the parties in each case was for the most
part confined to its separate time period." Id. The court noted that its decision would have been more difficult if the government had introduced evidence of the defendant's complicity in the conspiracy, which formed the basis
of the New York indictment, in the California trial. Id. at 609. The court
concluded that "[t]he significant fact is that the second trial did not amount
to a rehash of the evidence presented at the first trial, but was devoted to
proof of a different crime involving different evidence." Id.
45. See United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1049 (1976) (evidence of prior similar acts admissible with instructions to minimize any unfair prejudice); United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301
(7th Cir. 1968) (evidence of drug sale for which the defendant was previously
acquitted inadmissible). The Phillips decision did address the question of
collateral estoppel, but the determination of whether the trial court should
have admitted the evidence of conduct which was the subject of a prior
acquittal was made on the basis of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Id. at 304-05.
The court explained that "[filf the proffered evidence does not have substantial
relevance outweighing its potentially unduly prejudicial effect, its admission
is an abuse of discretion." Id. at 306. For the text of Rule 403, see note 9
supra.
46. FED. R. Evm. 404(b).

47. Id.
48. 464 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1972).
49. Id. The second trial involved a similar prosecution for smuggling
marijuana. Id. at 336. In both instances, the defendant was offered money
by men, who he claimed that he did not know, to drive a car across the
border; and, in both trials, denied any knowledge of the marijuana that was
found in the car. Id. at 337.
50. Id. Certainly a major factor in the court's appraisal of the effect of
the evidence was that the trial judge "carefully instructed the jury that [the
evidence] was admissible only on the issue of intent, and that it could be
considered solely for the purpose of determining whether the defendant .. .
had acted wilfully or innocently." Id. Judge Ely's dissent, however, was
primarily based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Id. at 338. Judge Ely
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Against this background, the Third Circuit analyzed the district
court's ruling which allowed cross-examination of Keller as to the drug
dealing for which he had previously been tried and acquitted. 51 The
Keller court first reviewed the pre-Ashe Third Circuit case law dealing
with defensive or evidentiary use of collateral estoppel. 52 The court
discussed its decisions in DeAngelo 5 and SimonZ4 noting that, in both
cases, the government was estopped from relitigating facts which had
been materially at issue in a former trial and conclusively determined
by the defendant's acquittal. 55
The Third Circuit distinguished Ashe on the ground that it involved a prosecutorial attempt to fragment offenses, whereas Keller concerned the evidentiary use of facts determined in a trial for independent
criminal conduct. 56 The court then discussd the constitutional scope of
collateral estoppe157 but found it unnecessary to decide whether the
Ashe constitutional mandate applied to the facts at issue.58 Rather, the
court found nothing in Ashe to suggest that the doctrinal approach to
collateral estoppel previously delineated in DeAngelo and Simon should
strongly advocated the preclusion of the defendant's previous arrest in accordance with the teachings of Ashe and Sealfon. Id.
Other decisions reflect a dual approach to the problem of admissibility of
prior acquittals in discussing both collateral estoppel and Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 and 404(b). See United States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954 (10th
Cir. 1979) (evidence relevant to motive and intent); Oliphant v. Koehler,
594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979) (evidence indicative
of plan or scheme to orchestrate events to prove consent).
51. 624 F.2d at 1155. The court held that the evidence was inadmissible under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and, therefore, did not reach
appellant's other contentions. Id. at 1157. For a summary of appellant's
claims of error, see note 9 supra.
52. 624 F.2d at 1157.
53. Id. See note 25 supra.
54. 624 F.2d at 1157. See note 24 supra.
55. 624 F.2d at 1157. See United States v. Simon, 225 F.2d at 261; United
States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d at 469. It is interesting to note that in both
DeAngelo and Simon, the defendant was being tried on charges arising out
of the same basic criminal episode involved in the previous acquittal. See
notes 24 & 25 supra.
56. 624 F.2d at 1158.
57. Id. at 1158-60.
58. Id. at 1159-60. The court first recognized that:
It might be possible to read Ashe v. Swenson as incorporating within
the double jeopardy clause only that anti-harassment aspect of collateral
estoppel which bars reprosecution since there is a qualitative difference
between reprosecution and the broader scope of collateral estoppel as
applied to the evidentiary use of prior acquittals in prosecutions involving different offenses .

. .

.

As long as the subsequent prose-

cution is not precluded by the double jeopardy clause, the antiharassment function of collateral estoppel may lose much of its relevance
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be curtailed 59 and concluded that issue preclusion is not confined only
to those instances which would be coextensive with a plea of double
jeopardy60
Once the Keller court determined that the broader doctrinal scope
of collateral estoppel was in no way affected by Ashe, the only remaining
question was whether the facts of Keller mandated reversal. 01 The court
rejected the government's contention that the undisputed fact of the 1978
distributions by Keller, as opposed to his acquittal, was put in issue on
cross-examination.6 2 The Third Circuit reasoned, however, that to hold
that the evidence of the previous conduct was admissible would "eviscerate the effect of the prior acquittal." 63 In support of this position,
since it is the requirement of standing trial which constitutes the
forbidden harassment.
Id. at 1159. However, the court also noted that the definition of collateral
estoppel was never fully discussed in Ashe and "could be interpreted to mean
that the [Supreme] Court intended to bar any use in subsequent prosecutions
of evidence previously determined in defendant's favor by a prior verdict of
acquittal." Id. at 1159-60 n.5 (emphasis in original). This latter view is the
one adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Wingate and the Second Circuit in Mes-

poulede. See notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra. The Keller court did
note, however, that:

There will undoubtedly be future cases in which a determination must

be made as to the coextensiveness of constitutional collateral estoppel and doctrinal collateral estoppel. It may arise when plain error
is asserted, when it is raised in habeas corpus as distinguished from
direct appeal, or in consideration of the scope of the applicability
of collateral estoppel to the states. None of these circumstances are
presented by the facts or procedural posture of this case.
624 F.2d at 1160 n.6.
59. 624 F.2d at 1159.
60. Id. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see note 58, supra.
61. 624 F.2d at 1160.
62. Id. The government attempted to distinguish Keller from previous
case law on the ground that Keller did not deny his participation in the 1978
distributions but claimed that he was entrapped. Brief for Appellee at 11,
United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1980). The government argued
that "[i]t is not the result of the prior case that was material, but rather the
facts which were undisputed." Id. (emphasis in original).
63. 624 F.2d at 1160. The court stated that "the government would have
us hold that the prior conduct is admissible notwithstanding the determination
by the earlier fact finder that the defendant's state of knowledge and level of
participation did not satisfy the requirement of the criminal law." Id., citing
United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1968). In Phillips, the

Seventh Circuit held that it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to have
allowed evidence of allegedly criminal prior conduct without informing the
jury of the acquittal. Id. at 305. It left the jury free to decide anew the
"state of appellant's knowledge and the extent of his participation" in the
earlier transaction, an issue conclusively determined by the previous verdict of
acquittal. Id. For a discussion of Phillips, see note 45 supra.
In Keller, the transcript of the district court proceedings reveals that the
prosecution did not question the defendant about the charges, indictment or
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the court expressed agreement with the Fifth Circuit's rationale in
Wingate 64 and the teachings of the Second Circuit in Mespoulede 65

that fundamental fairness prohibits any attempt by the government to
offer proof that a defendant committed a crime which a jury has decided
that he did not commit. 66 The court concluded by stating that the
government's position in Keller would place an unjust burden on the
defendant by requiring him to "relitigate the very issue a jury decided
in his favor." 67

It is submitted that the Keller decision correctly reaffirms its longstanding support for the sound legal principle that facts actually decided
in a defendant's favor cannot be relitigated in a second trial regardless
of whether they are necessary to support the verdict in the subsequent
trial.6 8 The factual situation in Keller, however, can be distinguished
from previous case law to the extent that the application of collateral
estoppel may be inapposite when the previous acquittal rests on the
defense of entrapment. 9
It is readily apparent that Keller was charged with two different
offenses based on two different criminal episodes separated in time by
over six months.70 The evidence offered by the prosecution thus differed
considerably in the two trials. 7 ' Moreover, the government did not
judicial disposition following the 1978 distributions. Rather, it was the defense counsel who pursued this line of inquiry on re-direct examination and
elicited from Keller the fact of his acquittal. Transcript, United States v.
Keller, No. 78-365 (E.D. Pa., May 25, 1979).
64. See Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972); notes 29-30
and accompanying text supra.
65. See United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1979); notes
31-32 and accompanying text supra.
66. 624 F.2d at 1160.
67. Id., quoting United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d at 334.
68. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying note
60 supra.

69. See notes 70-86 and accompanying text infra.
70. 624 F.2d at 1155-56.
71. See id. Compare the facts of Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547, 55455 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979); King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435,
437-39 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gala, 521 F.2d 605, 606-09 (2d Cir.

1975) (cases where the subsequent prosecution involved independent criminal
conduct, thus the evidence differed considerably from that introduced in the
prior acquittal) with the factual pattern of United States v. Simon, 225 F.2d
at 261; United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d at 467-68 (cases involving trials
arising out of the same criminal episode, therefore evidence in both trials was
substantially the same). For a discussion of Oliphant and King, see note 33
supra. For a discussion of Cala, see notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of DeAngelo and Simon, see notes 24 & 25 supra. But see
Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d at 213 (the Fifth Circuit clearly indicated

that there would be no "same transaction" limitation in the constitutional
scope of collateral estoppel).
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seek to introduce evidence in the second trial which was necessarily inconsistent with the previous acquittal. 72 Clearly, the admitted distributions were not the basis of the acquittal in the first prosecution. Rather,
the jury's verdict was grounded on a finding that Keller's conduct was
induced by the government. 73 Consequently, it is submitted that appli.
cation of the Ashe test - whether a rational jury could have rested its
verdict on an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to preclude - need not result in the exclusion of the evidence on the basis of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 74
It is further submitted that an acquittal based on an entrapment
defense presents a unique situation 75 which demands a more detailed
analysis of the relationship between the evidence sought to be introduced and the previous judgment.76 If the evidence admitted at the
second trial actually amounts to a relitigation of the issue of the defendant's guilt resolved in the first trial, the use of that evidence is
clearly precluded. 77 The Keller court, however, did not specifically
address the question of whether the cross-examination concerning the
1978 distributions represented a reexamination of the guilt issue. 78 In
view of the peculiar nature of the previous acquittal, 79 this question
would seem to be an essential step in the court's rationale.
72. See 624 F.2d at 1156. The cross-examination elicited admissions made
under oath by the defendant in the previous trial. Id. Such admissions were
implicit in an acquittal based on an entrapment defense. See note 75 infra.
73. 624 F.2d at 1156.
74. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
75. See W. LAFAVE 8c A. ScoTr, supra note 4, at 369-75. Though generally a not guilty plea is raised by the defendant, in this context, the defendant would admit having engaged in the proscribed conduct and proceed
to offer evidence to support the theory of entrapment. Id. at 373. This type
of defense is clearly a departure from the traditional not guilty plea where the
defendant denies having any involvement in the events charged in the
indictment.
76. See note 32 and accompanying text supra. The Mespoulede court
warned that the important constitutional guarantees of Ashe could not be
applied without a thorough examination of the entire record of both trials.
597 F.2d at 330.
77. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra; note 44 supra.
78. See note 87 infra. The rationale in the Keller opinion is devoted
almost entirely to the doctrinal scope of collateral estoppel and its coextensiveness with the Ashe constitutional mandate. 624 F.2d at 1156-60. Only in the
last two paragraphs does the court address the argument that Keller is distinguishable from other situations involving the application of collateral
estoppel. Id. at 1160.
79. See notes 69-73 and accompanying text supra; note 75 supra; notes

80-86 and accompanying text infra. Keller's acquittal based on an entrapment
defense is distinguishable from the type of verdicts rendered in Simon and
DeAngelo. See notes 24 & 25 supra. Both of those cases involved trials which
arose out of the same criminal episode where the government's case in the
second trial would, of necessity, include much of the same evidence pre-
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Whether the admission into evidence of the undisputed facts of the
previous trial can be characterized as denying the effect of the prior
acquittal can, it is suggested, only be answered if there is a close analysis
of the implications of the jury's verdict and consideration of how the
proffered evidence bears on that verdict.8 0 With a verdict of acquittal
based on an entrapment defense, two lines of argument could be developed as to the characterization of the jury's verdict. The traditional,
or "subjective," view is that the jury's findings amounted to the conclusion that Keller would never have engaged in distributing methamphetamine but for the inducement of the government. 8 ' Using that
approach, one could argue that the distributions were, in a legal sense,
non-existent and any further use of that evidence by the government
for any purpose would thus deny the effect of the acquittal.8 2 Although
it would seem that the courts of appeals would be unable to deviate
from this test, some courts, including the Third Circuit, have devised
ways to circumvent or broaden this rule.83 Under the "objective" apsented in the previous acquittal. Id. In both cases, the prosecution's attempted proof in the second trial was in direct conflict with the jury's previous
determination of innocence and clearly involved a relitigation of the guilt
issue decided in the first trial. Id.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Larkin, 605 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1979) (lengthy
analysis of the basis of the jury's decision coupled with a discussion of
whether those findings would be adverse to the government's proof in the
subsequent trial).
81. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scor, supra note 4, at 369. This approach is
based on an implied exception in the statute defining the crime which exempts the entrapped person from liability under the statute. Id. The focus
is on the character of the defendant. Id. at 371. If it can be determined that
the defendant had no predisposition to engage in criminal activity, but instead, that his conduct was induced by the government, there can be no
guilt for the crime in question. Id. at 372. This view of the entrapment
defense (referred to as the subjective test) has been endorsed as the proper
test by the Supreme Court. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 484,
488 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 370-71 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 442 (1932).
82. See Brief for Appellant at 12-14, United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154
(3d Cir. 1980).
83. See United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (conviction reversed on a finding that the role of the government had passed the point of
toleration); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 949 (1973) (entrapment established as a matter of law where drugs
sold by the defendant to a government agent were supplied by a government
informant). Cf. United States v. Janotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(convictions reversed on the alternative ground that governmental overreaching amounted to a violation of the defendant's due process rights). For a
discussion of the minority, or objective view of entrapment, see note 85 infra.
Justice Frankfurter has commented that since the Sorrells case, the lower
courts have often ignored its theory and continue to rest their decisions on
the facts of each case. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See Note, supra note 4, at 197-213; Note,
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proach, which has been endorsed in several concurring and dissenting
Supreme Court opinions,8 4 the jury's verdict would be viewed as a conclusion that there was illegal conduct, but that the defendant could not
be subjected to criminal sanctions due to the entrapment.8 5 Under this
view, the subsequent attempt by the government in Keller to show continuing association with drugs as a method of impeaching credibility
would not be in conflict with the previous verdict.86
This kind of extended analysis is not forthcoming in the Keller
opinion',87 The holding merely implies that the admission of the undisputed distributions is a relitigation of the guilt issue resolved by the
prior acquittal, but there is no explanation given to support that conclusion.88 While there is no question that "it is fundamentally unfair
and totally incongruous with our basic concepts of justice to permit the
sovereign to offer proof that a defendant committed a specific crime
which a jury of that sovereign has concluded he did not commit," 89 the
facts in Keller may not present that situation. Even if the result in the
Criminal Procedure (1980).

Entrapment, 6

WM.

'MITCHELL

L. REv. 201, 202-03

84. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (1976) (Brennan,

J., dissenting); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frank.
furter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932)

(Roberts,

J., concurring).

85. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 4. The focus of the objective
approach is on the extent of the improper police conduct rather than the
defendant's predisposition. Id. at 371. The entrapped person is "guilty"
of the illegal conduct but is not held criminally liable for policy reasons:
deterring improper police practices, safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary,
and avoiding a strained reading of the criminal statute. Id. at 372. There
is a somewhat hazy distinction between police conduct which constitutes entrapment under the objective theory and that which is so offensive that it
merits condemnation as a violation of the defendant's due process rights. See
United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (reversal based on due
process violation rather than entrapment defense). See generally Donnelly,

supra note 4; Rotenberg, supra note 4.

86. See Brief for Appellee at 11, United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154
(3d Cir. 1980). In failing to consider the issue of whether the facts of the
previous acquittal or the charges therein were being relitigated, the Keller court
ignores, rather than refutes, the proposition that the thrust of the cross-examination was nothing more than an attempt to impeach the defendant's testimony
concerning his motive in the 1977 conspiracy. See text accompanying notes
64-67 supra.
87. See notes 61-67 and accompanying text supra. The Keller court simply stated that the previous verdict of acquittal indicated that the requirements
of the criminal law were not satisfied and concluded that admitting the evi.
dence would "eviscerate the effect of the prior acquittal." 624 F.2d at 1160.
See note 63 supra. The remaining language is devoted to quotes from Wingate and Mespoulede. 624 F.2d at 1160.
88. See note 87 supra.
89. Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d at 215.
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present case would be unchanged, 90 however, in view of the widespread
academic criticism of the subjective approach to entrapment, 91 the Third
Circuit's departure from strict adherence to that approach, 92 and the increasing complexity of the entrapment and due process issues engendered
by more sophisticated investigative techniques, 93 it is submitted that the
courts would do well to employ a more detailed framework of analysis
in cases such as Keller involving collateral estoppel of evidence arising
out of entrapment-based acquittals.
As an alternative to the collateral estoppel analysis in this narrow
class of cases, it is suggested that the Federal Rules of Evidence provide
a better method of review for the type of evidence Keller sought to exclude. 94 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is generally geared to the
admissibility of other acts, wrongs or crimes whose existence is uncontested.9 5 Collateral estoppel, however, excludes evidence of other acts
that is contrary to the overall determination in the previous adjudication. 96 In addition, the balancing test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403
is aimed at protecting a defendant from the admission of evidence which
would interfere with a jury's unbiased approach to the defendant's guilt
or innocence as regards the particular charge being tried. 97 In Keller,
the 1978 distributions, although undisputed, might well have been so
prejudicial as to preclude their introduction. Consequently, it is suggested that, in cases where the challenged evidence springs from an
90. See text accompanying notes 81-86 supra. Since there was no indica-

tion that extremely offensive police conduct was a factor in Keller's acquittal
for the 1978 distributions, it could well be presumed that the jury's verdict
was entirely centered on the lack of predisposition and the analysis based on
the subjective theory of entrapment would prevail. See text accompanying
notes 81-82 supra.

91. See Rossum, The Entrapment Defense and the Supreme Court: On
Defining the Limits of PoliticalResponsibility, 7 MEM. ST. L. REv. 367, 386-87
(1977). According to Rossum, the "overwhelming majority of commentators" favor the objective approach in varying degrees, including the American
Law Institute and the authors of the proposed Federal Criminal Code. Id.
Out of a survey of 25 law review articles published on entrapment since
1950, Rossum found only two that have favored the subjective approach. Id.
92. See United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
93. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (government
supplied facilities and some of the ingredients for the manufacture of methamphetamine); United States v. Janotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(government provided extremely generous financial inducement and appealed
to the public official's sense of civic duty).

94. For a discussion of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see notes 45-50
and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra. Evidence of the 1978
distributions would, it is suggested, be characterized as "other acts" under

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).

96. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.

97. For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, see note 9 supra.
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acquittal based on an entrapment defense, the Federal Rules of Evidence may provide an analytical framework which is both sounder and
more flexible than the collateral estoppel approach as utilized by the
Keller court.
While Keller neither formulates a broader statement of the law
than does previous authority 98 nor mandates the application of collateral estoppel in similar cases as a constitutional matter, 99 the decision
does serve to expand the principle of issue preclusion to a type of fact
pattern quite distinct from that presented in Ashe 100 and prior Third
Circuit decisions. 101 In following Keller, lower courts may now feel
compelled to use collateral estoppel as a total bar to the use of evidence
of conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted, regardless of the
nature of the facts to be precluded. Thus, the decision may well serve
to hamper prosecutors' attempts to challenge a defendant's credibility in
these instances to the detriment of the factfinding process.
Anne P. Stark
98. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
100. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
101. See note 79 supra.
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FEDERAL YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT -

OFFENDER SENTENCED

A

YOUTH

TO A CONSECUTIVE TERM OF LIFE IMPRISON-

MENT WHILE SERVING A PRIOR SENTENCE UNDER THE FEDERAL

YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT MAY BE CONFINED AMONG THE
GENERAL POPULATION OF A FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION FOR THE REMAINDER OF HIS PRIOR
SENTENCE.

Thompson v. Carlson (1980)
In 1974, Richard Thompson was convicted in federal court of
assault with intent to commit rape.' Under the provisions of the
Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA or Act), 2 he received an eight year
sentence.3 While serving his YCA sentence in the Federal Correctional
Institution at Lompoc, California, Thompson was involved in the
murder of a fellow inmate.4 His participation led to a conviction for
first degree murder and Thompson was sentenced to a consecutive adult
1. Thompson v. Carlson, 624 F.2d 415, 416 (3d Cir. 1980). Thompson was
seventeen years old when he was convicted. Id. Thompson was prosecuted
in federal court because the assault was committed on a federal reservation.

Id.
2. 18 U.S.C. §§5005-5026 (1976). For a discussion of the purpose, provisions, and background of the Act, see notes 12-23 and accompanying text
infra.
3. 624 F.2d at 416. This sentence was imposed pursuant to § 5010(c) of
the YCA which provides:
If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to

derive maximum benefit from treatment by the Commission prior to
the expiration of six years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu
of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence
the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period
that may be authorized by law for the offense or offenses of which
he stands convicted or until discharged by the Commission as provided in section 5017(d) of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. §5010(c) (1976). For a discussion of other sentencing options,
-see note 14 infra.
Thompson was initially committed to the Federal Correctional Institution
at Ashland, Kentucky. 624 F.2d at 416. In 1975, while at the Federal Cor-

rectional Institution at Milan, Michigan, he assaulted an inmate and received
an incident report for threatening a staff member with bodily harm as well as

for assault and disruptive conduct. Id. Thompson was subsequently transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution at El Reno, Oklahoma, for
"adjustment purposes" but while there he received still more incident reports, including one for making a sharpened weapon. Id. at 416-17. He
was then transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution at Lompoc,
California. Id. at 417. While en route he was involved in a fight with an.
other person. Id.
4. 624 F.2d at 416. Thompson's participation consisted of acting as a
lookout while several other inmates stabbed a fellow prisoner. Id. While

(657)
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term of life imprisonment.5 Thompson was subsequently transferred to
the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, where he
was held without being segregated from adult prisoners.8 While confined at Lewisburg, Thompson petitioned for a writ of habeus corpus to
determine whether his present confinement complied with the provisions
of the YCA. 7 After a hearing, the magistrate found that Thompson's
original sentence under the YCA entitled him to continued segregation
from adult offenders. 8 The magistrate relied largely on the Third
Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold.9 The
district court adopted the magistrate's findings, and granted the writ
of habeas corpus. 10 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
awaiting trial on the murder charge, Thompson assaulted a corrections officer
and was sentenced to a one year concurrent jail term.

Id. at 417.

Following

his conviction for first degree murder and his subsequent transfer to Lewisburg
Penitentiary, Thompson was involved in yet another assault on a staff member, threatened another staff member with bodily harm, and incited other

inmates to riot. Id.
5. Id. at 416.

The trial judge made a specific finding that Thompson

would not derive benefit from further treatment under the special provisions
of the YCA. Id.
6. Id. at 417.

7. Id. At Lewisburg, Thompson was assigned to the general prison population. Id. He claimed that because he still had time to serve under his
YCA sentence, he was entitled to be segregated from adult offenders. Id.
Thompson relied on § 5011 of the Act which provides in pertinent part: "In
so far as practical , . . . institutions and agencies [designated by the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons] shall be used only for treatment of committed youth
offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders
[not sentenced under the terms of the Act]." 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976).
8. 624 F.2d at 417. Although the magistrate agreed with Thompson's
contention that he was entitled by law to continued segregation, he noted in
his report that it was his opinion that Thompson would not benefit from
further confinement under the terms of the YCA. Id. He based this conclusion on Thompson's violent and disruptive behavior while imprisoned
and on the inevitability of Thompson's future confinement under a regular
adult sentence. Id.
For an account of Thompson's conduct while imprisoned, see note 3
supra. The magistrate also pointed out that Thompson could be a disruptive

influence on those youth offenders who have been responsive to YCA treatment if he was confined with them. 624 F.2d at 417.
9. 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978), noted in The Third Circuit Review, 24
VILL. L. REv. 285 (1979).

companying text infra.
10. 624 F.2d at 417.

For a discussion of Dancy, see notes 19-23 and ac-

The district court also interpreted the Dancy deci-

sion as mandating that an individual, who is sentenced to a consecutive adult
term while serving a YCA sentence, be incarcerated in a YCA facility until
the expiration of the YCA sentence. Id. The district court observed that
Thompson's difficulties as a prisoner could be effectively handled pursuant
to §5011 of the YCA which not only provides for the segregation of youth
offenders sentenced under the Act from adult offenders, but also allows for
the segregation of classes of committed youth offenders according to their needs
for treatment. Id., citing 18 U.S.C. §5011 (1976). For the text of §5011, see
note 20 infra.
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the Third Circuit 11 reversed, holding that a prisoner who is given a
consecutive sentence of life imprisonment as an adult offender while he
is serving a YCA sentence need not serve the remainder of the YCA
sentence at a special YCA facility, but may be returned to the general
prison population. Thompson v. Carlson, 624 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1980).
The YCA, enacted in 1950,12 was designed to "substitute for
retributive punishment methods of training and treatment designed to
correct and prevent anti-social tendencies of youth offenders," 13 and to
provide federal judges with a system of sentencing that will "promote
the rehabilitation of those who in the opinion of the sentencing judge
show promise of becoming useful citizens, and so will avoid the degenerative and needless transformation of many of these young people
into habitual criminals." 14 The United States Supreme Court has
viewed the Act in a similar manner. 15 In Dorszynski v. United States,16
the Court noted that the YCA was designed "to provide a better method
for treating young offenders convicted in federal courts in that vulner11. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Rosenn and Sloviter. Judge
Sloviter wrote the opinion for the majority, in which Judge Rosenn joined.
Judge Adams dissented in a separate opinion.
12. Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950, ch. 1115, §2, 64 Stat. 1085
(1950) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976)).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1950]

U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3985. The YCA originated in a report by a
subcommittee of the Judicial Conference of the United States which found
that criminal tendencies were formed between the ages of 16 and 23. See
Note, supra note 9, at 287, citing H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3984.
14. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1950] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3983. The courts are in agreement that this is the
major purpose of the YCA. See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S.
424, 433 (1974); United States ex rel Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d at 111; Abernathy v. United States, 418 F.2d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 1969); Brown v. Carlson,
431 F. Supp. 755, 765 (W.D. Wis. 1977). The system contemplated by Congress was modeled after the English Borstal System. See note 48 infra. If
the sentencing judge is of the opinion that it is unnecessary to commit the
youth, the youth may be placed on probation. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976). If
some form of confinement is deemed necessary, the court may, in lieu of the
penalty otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody
of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to the Act
for not more than four years, or until discharged by the United States Parole
Commission. 18 U.S.C. §§5010(b), 5017(c) (1976). If the court determines
that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum benefit from
treatment by the United States Parole Commission prior to the expiration of
six years from the date of conviction, it may sentence the offender for any
further period authorized by law for the offense in question, or until discharged, as provided in §5017(d), by the United States Parole Commission.
18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(c), 5017(c) (1976). See 18 U.S.C. § 5017(d) (1976). If, however, the sentencing judge makes an express finding that the youth offender
would not derive benefit from treatment under §§5010(b) or 5010(c), he
may then sentence the offender under any other applicable penalty provision.
18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976).
15. See Note, supra note 9, at 288-89.
16. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
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able age bracket [16-22], to rehabilitate them and restore normal beThe objective of these [sentencing] options reprehavior patterns ....
sented a departure from traditional sentencing, and focused primarily
on correction and rehabilitation." 17 The Supreme Court further observed that "an integral part of the treatment program was the segregation of the committed persons, insofar as practicable, so as to place
them with those similarly committed, to avoid the influence of association with the more hardened inmates serving traditional criminal
sentences." 18
In United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold,1 the Third Circuit examined section 5011 of the YCA, which describes the institutional
treatment to which YCA offenders can be committed.2 0 The issue in
Dancy was whether youth offenders sentenced under the YCA must be
segregated from adult prisoners in an institution which provides YCA
facilities and treatment. 21 Relying on the propositions that the purpose of the Act is the rehabilitation of youth offenders and that the nonsegregation of youth and adult offenders is inconsistent with this
rehabilitative purpose, 22 the Dancy court concluded that the confinement of a youth offender in the general population of a federal
penitentiary conflicted with the statutory scheme and congressional
23
intent.
17. Note, supra note 9, at 288-89, quoting Dorszynski v. United States,
418 U.S. at 433.
18. 418 U.S. at 433.
19. 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). Section 5011 of the Act provides:
Committed youth offenders not conditionally released shall undergo
treatment in institutions of maximum security, medium security, or
minimum security types, including training schools, hospitals, farms,
forestry and other camps, and other agencies that will provide the essential varieties of treatment. The Director shall from time to time
designate, set aside, and adopt institutions and agencies under the
control of the Department of Justice for treatment. In so far as
practicable, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for
treatment of committed youth offenders, and such offenders shall be
segregated from other offenders, and classes of committed youth offenders shall be segregated according to their needs for treatment.
Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of the YCA, see Note, supra
note 9, at 287-88.
21. 572 F.2d at 108.
22. Id. at 112. For a discussion of the purpose of the Act, see note 14
and accompanying text supra.
23. 572 F.2d at 113. The Dancy court interpreted the phrase "in so far
as practical" in §5011, to mean that the youths sentenced under the YCA are
to receive treatment at institutions of the types enumerated in §5011, and
that "in so far as practical, these institutions should be used only for that
purpose." Id. at 109. For the text of § 5011, see note 20 supra. The Dancy
court further stated, "[i]n any event, however, youths committed under the
YCA must be segregated from other offenders even if it is impractical to place
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In deciding Thompson, the Third Circuit relied largely on the
language of the YCA, its legislative history, and a tradition of judicial
discretion in sentencing. 24 The court did not rely on Dancy and, in
fact, took pains to distinguish Thompson from Dancy.25

It did so by

noting that the construction of the YCA given in Dancy was based on a
fact pattern in which the youth offender would be released following

completion of his YCA sentence. 26 The court reasoned that segregation
of a youth offender who was to be released after his YCA sentence made
sense in view of the Act's aim of protecting youth offenders from
hardened criminals, but that there was no comparable need for segregation if the offender was to serve a consecutive life sentence upon
27
completion of his YCA term.
Having thus disposed of Dancy as controlling precedent, the court
in Thompson began its analysis by noting that the purpose of the Act
is the rehabilitation of the youth offender. 28 The court observed that
them in institutions used solely for the treatment of youth offenders." 572
F.2d at 109.
A majority of federal courts which have considered this issue have reached
a contrary result, maintaining that a youth sentenced under the Act could
be confined in places lacking separate YCA treatment facilities. See, e.g.,
Abernathy v. United States, 418 F.2d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1969) (Attorney General is empowered to designate the place of confinement of any federal prisoner
pursuant to § 4082(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code; discretion is not limited
by the terms of the YCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a), (b) (1976)); Barr v. United
States, 415 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Foote v. United States, 306

F. Supp. 627, 628 (D. Nev. 1969); United States v. Reef, 268 F. Supp. 1015,
1017 (D. Colo. 1967) (dictum).
24. 624 F.2d at 420-22. The Third Circuit noted that not only was this
a case of first impression, but also that the issue presented by the fact situation
had not been within the contemplation of Congress when it enacted the YCA.
Id. The Third Circuit defined its task as one of filling in the "interstices"
of the statute. Id.
25. Id. at 420.
26. Id. Conrad Dancy had been convicted of first degree felony murder
and of carrying a pistol without a license and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976). 572 F.2d at 108-09. For
a discussion of the sentencing procedure under § 5010(c), see note 14 supra.
The Thompson court recognized that the Tenth Circuit had previously
held that a statutory or constitutional conflict does not arise when a subsequent adult sentence is imposed on a youth offender currently serving a YCA
sentence. Id. at 421, citing Roddy v. United States, 509 F.2d 1145, 1147 (10th
Cir. 1975); Nast v. United States, 415 F.2d 338, 340 (10th Cir. 1969). It observed, however, that these cases had preceded its own decision in Dancy and
therefore did not consider the effect of the second sentence on the terms and
conditions of confinement under the original YCA sentence. 624 F.2c[ at 421.
For a discussion of Dancy, see notes 19-23 and accompanying text infra.
27. 624 F.2d at 420. The Thompson court noted that "the Act was designed to spare youth offenders the corruptive influence of prison life and
association with adult criminals." Id., quoting United States ex rel. Dancy
v. Arnold, 572 F.2d at 112 (emphasis by the Thompson court).
28. 624 F.2d at 420. See note 14 supra. Congress had been concerned
that a great number of youths imprisoned in penal institutions develop antisocial conduct and become hardened criminals. 624 F.2d at 420. The congressional history indicates that the Act was designed for those who "show
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section 5023 of the Act provides for recognition of rehabilitation by
allowing a judge to reevaluate a YCA sentence and to suspend the
29
sentence by placing a youth offender on probation.
The Thompson court conceded that the facts of the case differed
from the scheme contemplated under section 5023 of the Act in that
Thompson's YCA sentence was being reconsidered, not to determine
if he was rehabilitated adequately to be paroled, but to determine
whether he would derive any benefit from further confinement under
the YCA or whether he should spend the remainder of his YCA
sentence in an adult prisoner population. 0 It concluded that this
distinction was not critical and that "it would not be inconsistent with
the statutory scheme to hold that a judicial reevaluaion of the continued
benefit of commitment as a YCA offender is permissible when such a
reevaluation is triggered by the offender's own commission of a
crime." 31 The Thompson court found that in the case before it, the
second sentencing judge had undertaken such a reevaluation and that
his determination that Thompson could not benefit from the provisions
of the Act and would therefore serve his second sentence as an adult
prisoner was also a finding that continued YCA treatment under the
original sentence would no longer be beneficial.32 Thus, Thompson
could be transferred to an adult prison for the remainder of his original
3
sentence.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Adams asserted that the construction of the YCA in Dancy is controlling and requires youth
offenders serving a YCA sentence to be segregated from adult offenders
at all times.8 4 Judge Adams noted that there is "no statutory basis for
permitting a second sentencing judge to reevaluate the continued benefit to a youth offender of treatment under a YCA sentence previously
promise of becoming useful citizens." Id., quoting H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3983.
29. 624 F.2d at 421. Section 5023(a) of the YCA provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the power of any

court to suspend the imposition or execution of any sentence and place

a youth offender on probation or be construed in any way to amend,

repeal or effect the provisions of chapter 231 of this title or the Act
of June 25, 1910 (ch. 433, 36 Stat. 864), as amended (ch. 1, title 24,
of the D. of C. Code), both relative to probation,
18 U.S.C. § 5023(a) (1976).

30. 624 F.2d at 421-22.
31. Id. According to the Thompson court, the second sentencing judge
must determine whether the prisoner can benefit from treatment under the
YCA. Id. at 421. This determination would be made in light of the prisoner's
record during his confinement under the original YCA sentence and the nature
of the subsequent offense. Id.
32. Id. at 422.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 423 (Adams, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Dancy, see notes

19-23 and accompanying text supra.
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imposed by a different trial judge for an entirely separate offense." 85
In support of his position, Judge Adams stated that Congress, in enacting "the most comprehensive federal statute concerned with sentencing"
would have provided for this type of reconsideration of YCA sentences
36
had it so intended.
Judge Adams then pointed out that without any supporting
language in the Act, the majority's conclusion is contrary to traditional
Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in
sentencing doctrine.37
Dorszynski 8 Judge Adams noted that it was the intent of Congress to
place the sentencing function exclusively in the trial court and that it is
a longstanding rule that no court may review a sentence imposed by a
trial court so long as that sentence is within the statute and does not
violate the United States Constitution. 89
Upon review of the Thompson opinion, it is submitted that its
construction of the YCA to allow "judicial reevaluation" is at once
unsupported by the language of the Act and contrary to both traditional
35. 624 F.2d at 425 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams asserted that
the majority's reliance on § 5023 as support for their judicial reevaluation is
ill-founded. Id. at 425-26 (Adams, J., dissenting). See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra. He stated that § 5023 "simply makes clear that the
YCA was not meant to limit or affect any already existing power of a court
regarding suspended sentences and probation," and does not touch the issue
of whether a second judge may reevaluate the continued benefit of further
confinement under the Act or in any way change the nature of that treatment.
624 F.2d at 426 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams concluded that the
majority's construction of the Act is without statutory support and that the
proposed "judicial reevaluation" is at best not specifically prohibited by the
YCA. Id.
Judge Adams also attacked the majority's finding that the second sentencing judge held that Thompson would not benefit from further YCA treatment
under his original sentence. Id. at 425 (Adams, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 32 supra. Citing the sentencing order, judge Adams pointed
out that it contains no direct reference to Thompson's current YCA sentence
and, although it is reasonable to assume that the second sentencing judge knew
that Thompson was then serving a YCA sentence, it is likely that his attention
was focused on whether Thompson would benefit from a second YCA sentence. 624 F.2d at 425 (Adams, J., dissenting).
36. 624 F.2d at 426 (Adams, J., dissenting), quoting Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. at 432.
37. 624 F.2d at 426 (Adams, J., dissenting).
38. The issue addressed by the Court in Dorszynski was the conditions
under which a trial judge could sentence a youth to an adult sentence under

the YCA. 418 U.S. at 425. The Supreme Court held that §5010(d) of the
YCA required an express "no benefit" finding by the trial judge before he
could sentence a youth, otherwise eligible for a YCA sentence, to an adult
sentence. Id. at 443-44. See 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976).
39. 624 F.2d at 426 (Adams, J., dissenting), citing Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. at 440-41. Further, the Supreme Court has stated that the
"Act was meant to enlarge, not restrict, the sentencing options of federal trial courts in order to . . . promote the rehabilitation of [youth
offenders] who in the opinion of the sentencing judge, show promise

of becoming useful citizens."

624 F.2d at 426-27 (Adams, J., dissenting),

quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added by Judge
Adams).
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sentencing doctrine and the intent of Congress. 40 The parallel which
the majority draws between reevaluating a sentence to place a youth,
committed under the Act, on probation and the reevaluation which
allows Thompson to be placed in an adult penitentiary, though initially
appealing, is not to be found in the provisions of the YCA.41 Further,
the decision reached in Thompson is at odds with the Supreme Court's
decision in Dorszynski, which stated that "[t]he intent of Congress [in
enacting the YCA] was in accord with long-established authority in the
United States vesting the sentencing function exclusively in the trial
court." 42 It is firmly established in criminal practice that this sentence
43
may not be reviewed by another court unless it is outside of the statute.
The holding is also at odds with the congressional intent which was to
"promote the rehabilitation of [youth offenders] who in the opinion of
the sentencing judge, show promise of becoming useful citizens ...., 44
Although unsupported by the traditional tools of statutory construction,4 5 it is submitted that the decision in Thompson may nonetheless succeed in furthering the purpose of the YCA. Considering
46
it
Thompson's poor behavior while incarcerated in youth facilities,
can be argued that he has already shown that he is not receptive to
YCA treatment and it would be futile to continue such treatment.
It is not unreasonable to suggest that had Congress contemplated this
situation, it would have provided a procedure by which a YCA offender
could be removed from YCA facilities.

47

40. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
41. See note 35 and accompanying text supra. This interpretation of the
YCA would be more accurately designated as a "judicially fashioned amendment" to the Act. 624 F.2d at 423 (Adams, J., dissenting).
42. 418 U.S. at 440.
43. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
44. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1950] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. at 3983.
45. See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
46. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
47. See 624 F.2d at 420. It was apparently not within the contemplation
of Congress that YCA treatment could be unsuccessful or that a youth, during
his YCA sentence, might commit a crime so severe that he would be required
to serve a subsequent sentence in an adult penitentiary. Id. Noting that the
purpose of the Act is rehabilitation, and that to this end treatment must begin "before the traits of the habitual criminal are allowed to develop," H.R.
REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1,reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. at 3983, it is submitted that Thompson has evidenced these traits
and that further YCA treatment would be useless and costly. Many persons
otherwise disposed toward enacting the YCA were concerned with the increased expenditures which would be required to implement it, and therefore
were hesitant to pass it. Id. at 7, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
at 3990. See 96 CONG. REc. 1283 (1950). It is suggested that the expressed
concern over costs is further support for the proposition that if Congress had
considered whether a person in Thompson's position should be accorded further
YCA treatment, it would have enacted a provision similar to § 5023 which
would allow "judicial reevaluation" to determine whether this person might
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It is difficult to determine, however, quite how far Congress intended to go in modeling the YCA on the English Borstal System.4 8
There is a strong indication that the English Borstal System encountered
youths who were not receptive to its programs.4 9 Instead of transferring
them to adult institutions, the Borstal system provided special programs
which would better accommodate their needs so that rehabilitation
might better be effectuated. 0 If Congress intended to adopt the
Borstal System with as few changes as possible, then the Third Circuit's
51
decision runs counter to that intent.
Though Thompson is destined to serve a consecutive adult sentence,
he is still at an age when "special factors operate to produce habitual
criminals." 52 Concededly, the imposition of a consecutive adult sentence on a youth offender may lessen the rehabilitative potential
afforded by a YCA facility, 53 but it is possible that a youth who completes his original sentence in a YCA facility would be "less susceptible
to the influence of hardened criminals during his subsequent confinement than one not so treated." 64 It would, therefore, be consistent with
the purpose of the YCA and its legislative history to conclude that
Thompson should remain in a YCA facility so that he may continue to
receive treatment which will help rehabilitate him so that he may
someday become a useful member of society. 55
benefit from further YCA treatment. See notes 29-31 8c 35 and accompanying
text supra.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7, reprinted in [1950)
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3985-3989. The system contemplated by Congress

was modeled after the English Borstal system, begun at the end of the 19th
century, in which youthful offenders were segregated from adult offenders and
special rehabilitative programs were established for them. Id. at 4, reprinted
in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 3987.

The three principles dominating

the Borstal system are: (1) flexibility, (2) individualization, and (3) emphasis
on intangibles. Id. In 1950, it contained 13 institutions, each with its own
specialty. Id. The system was flexible, monitoring the youth's conduct and
allowing transfer between the institutions so that the treatment accorded the
youth was best suited to his peculiar problems. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in [1950]
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 3987-88.

Section 5011 of the YCA expressly incor-

porates many of these aspects of the Borstal system as it provides for the
segregation of youth offenders according to their needs for treatment. 18
U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). See notes 10 &c20 supra.
49. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1950] U.S.
CODE CONG. SE-V. 3983, 3988.
50. Id.

51. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
52. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. at 432-33. See note I supra.
53. See Nast v. United States, 415 F.2d 338, 340 (10th Cir. 1969) (consecu.
tive character of sentence imposed under Escape Act upon person who had
been committed under the YCA did not offend YCA provisions). See note 5
supra.

54. 624 F.2d at 428 (Adams, J., dissenting).
55. See notes 48-52 and accompanying text supra.
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In conclusion, the Thompson court has indicated that the decision
reached is limited to the facts of the case. 56 Still, the Third Circuit in
Thompson has evidenced a more conservative interpretation of the Act
and it may be inferred from the opinion that the Dancy holding, mandating segregation of youth offenders, 57 will be subject to further
exceptions in the future. The support upon which the court bases its
holding indicates that this issue is one which is in need of congressional
guidance. 58 The Tenth Circuit in Nast v. United States 59 expressed
these same sentiments when it stated that "ft]he problem raised by
appellant is for such legislative consideration as it might enlist, rather
than one to be solved as appellant presses upon this court." 60 It is
hoped that such guidance will be forthcoming.
Peter D. Holbrook
56.
57.
supra.
58.
59.

624 F.2d at 419.
For a discussion of Dancy, see notes 19-23 and accompanying text

See notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra.
415 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1969).
60. Id. at 340.
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